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Abstract
We propose a proof of the downward Löwenheim-Skolem that relies on strategies deriving from
evaluation games instead of the Skolem normal forms. This proof is simpler, and easily under-
stood by the students, although it requires, when defining the semantics of first-order logic to
introduce first a few notions inherited from game theory such as the one of an evaluation game.
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1 Introduction
Each mathematical logic course focuses on first-order logic. Once the basic definitions
about syntax and semantics have been introduced and the notion of the cardinality of
a model has been exposed, sooner or later at least a couple of hours are dedicated to
the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. This statement holds actually two different results: the
downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem (LS↓) and the upward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem
(LS↑).
I Theorem 1 (Downward Löwenheim-Skolem). Let L be a first-order language, T some
L-theory, and κ = max{card (L) ,ℵ0}.
If T has a model of cardinality λ > κ, then T has a model of cardinality κ.
I Theorem 2 (Upward Löwenheim-Skolem). Let L be some first-order language with equality,
T some L-theory, and κ = max{card (L) ,ℵ0}.
If T has an infinite model, then T has a model of cardinality λ, for any λ > κ.
The proof of the second theorem (LS↑) is a simple exercise that relies on an easy application
of the compactness theorem joined with a straightforward utilization of LS↓. The proof
of the first theorem is more involved and not that easy to understand for undergraduate
students at EPFL. For some basic background and notations we refer the reader to [1, 5].
The usual approach to proving LS↓ goes through several steps which involve reducing the
original theory T to another theory T ′ on an extended language L′ where all statements
are in Skolem normal form. Then obtaining some L′-structure of the right cardinality that
satisfies T ′, from which one goes back to a model that satisfies T .
The burden of going through the Skolem normal forms is regarded as bothersome by the
student.
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We would like to advocate that the use of evaluation games greatly simplifies the proof of
LS↓. Of course, this requires to talk about finite two-player perfect games and the related
notions of player, strategies, winning strategies, etc. But it is worth the candle, especially
if these games are introduced for explaining the semantics of first-order logic. Anyhow,
determining whether a first-order formula holds true in a given structure is very similar to
solving the underlying evaluation game as put forward by Jaako Hintikka [4]. We refer the
readers unfamiliar with these notions to [6, 7], where the tight relations between logic and
games are disclosed.
2 Evaluation games for first-order logic
We noticed that when presented with both the classical semantics of first-order logic and the
semantics that makes use of evaluation games, the audience gets much more involved in the
second approach. Indeed, most students are more eager to solving games than to checking
whether a formula holds true.
Moreover, introducing first-order formulas not as (linear) sequences of symbols, but rather
as trees (usually denoted as decomposition tree) makes it even easier to give evidence in
support of the game-theoretical way of dealing with satisfaction. The reason is twofold:
1. the whole arena of the evaluation is very similar to the tree decomposition of the formula.
It has the very same height and the same branching except when quantifiers are involved,
where it depends on the cardinality of the domain of the model.
2. the task of pointing out the occurrences of variables that are bound by a given quantifier
– in order to replace them by an element of the domain chosen by one of the players – is
easily taken care of by taking the path along the unique branch that leads from a given
leaf of the tree where the occurrence of the variable is situated, to the root of the tree.
The first – if any – quantifier acting on this variable that is encountered is the one that
bounds it.
We recall the definition of the evaluation game for first-order logic.
I Definition 3. Let L be a first-order language, φ some closed formula whose logical
connectors are among {¬,∨,∧}, andM some L-structure.
The evaluation game Ev (M, φ) is defined as follows:
1. there are two players, called Verifier and Falsifier. Verifier (V) has incentive to show
that the formula holds in the L-structure (M |= φ), whereas the goal of Falsifier (F) is
to show that it does not hold (M 6|= φ).
The moves of the players essentially consist of pushing a token down the tree decomposition
of the formula φ – as a way to choose sub-formulas – and must comply with the rules
below:
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if the current position is. . . whose turn . . . the game continues with. . .
ϕ0 ∨ ϕ1 V chooses j ∈ {0, 1} ϕj
ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1 F chooses j ∈ {0, 1} ϕj
¬ϕ F and V switch roles ϕ
∃xiϕ V chooses ai ∈ |M| ϕ[ai/xi]
∀xiϕ F chooses ai ∈ |M| ϕ[ai/xi]
V wins
R(t1, · · · , tk)[a1/x1,··· ,an/xn] the game stops ⇐⇒
M, a1/x1, · · · , an/xn |= R(t1, · · · , tk)
2. The winning condition arises when the remaining formula becomes atomic, i.e. of the
form R(t1, · · · , tk)[a1/x1,··· ,an/xn]. Notice that the rules guarantee that, since the initial
formula is closed, one always ends up with an atomic formula that does not contain any
more variable as each of them has been replaced by some element of the domain of the
model 1.
PlayerV wins if R(t1, . . . , tk) is satisfied in the extended L-structureM, a1/x1, . . . , an/xn
(M, a1/x1, . . . , an/xn |= R(t1, . . . , tk)); F wins otherwise.
I Example 4. Suppose we have a language that contains a unary relation symbol P , a
binary relation symbol R, and a unary function symbol f. We then consider the formula
∀x
(
P (x) ∨ ∃yR(f(x), y)) whose tree decomposition is
8x
P (x)
R
 
f(b), a
 
_
9y
1 Formally we should not say that we replace each variable xi by some element ai, but rather that we
replace xi by some brand new constant symbol cai , whose interpretation is precisely this element ai
and the formula we reach at the end is of the form R(t1, . . . , tk)[ca1/x1,...,can/xn].
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the modelM is defined by:
|M| = {a, b}, fM(a) = b.
RM = {(b, a)}.
fM(b) = a
PM = {b},
The game tree that represents the arena for the evaluation game Ev (M,∀x (P (x) ∨ ∃yR(f(x), y)))
is played on the arena represented by the following game tree:
8x
_
9yP (a)
R
 
f(a), a
 
R
 
f(a), b
 
P (b)
R
 
f(b), b
 
R
 
f(b), a
 
_
9y
a/x b/x
a/y b/y a/y b/y
The green leaves are the ones where the atomic formula holds true in the model, and the
opposite for the red ones.
We then proceed by backward induction and assign either the colour green or the colour red
to every node depending on whether the Verifier or the Ffalsifier has a winning strategy if
the game were to start from that particular node.
__
8x
9yP (a)
R
 
f(a), a
 
R
 
f(a), b
 
P (b)
R
 
f(b), b
 
R
 
f(b), a
 
9y
a/x b/x
a/y b/y a/y b/y
We end up this way with the root being coloured green which shows that the Verifier has a
winning strategy. We indicate below by blue arrows such a winning strategy for the Verifier.
__
8x
9yP (a)
R
 
f(a), a
 
R
 
f(a), b
 
P (b)
R
 
f(b), b
 
R
 
f(b), a
 
9y
a/x b/x
a/y b/y a/y b/y
J. Duparc 31
3 The classical proof of LS↓ with Skolemization
Given any theory T as in Theorem 1, without loss of generality, one first assumes that
every formula φ ∈ T is in prenex normal form i.e. φ = Q1x1 . . . Qkxkψ, where, for all
1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, Qi, Qj ∈ {∀,∃}, xi 6= xj and ψ is quantifier free. Then, the usual proof of
(LS↓) goes through the following steps
1. The skolemization of each such φ, which consists of
a. first extending the language by adding, for each existential quantifier that φ contains,
a new function symbol fφk
(qk) of arity qk.
L′ = L ∪
{
fφk
(qk) | Qk = ∃, qk = card
({
m | 1 ≤ m < k ∧Qm = ∀
})}
.
With this definition qk coincides with the number of universal quantifiers which precede
the existential Qk.
b. For each existentially quantified variable xk, replacing inside ψ, each occurrence of
xk by the term2 fφk
(
xp1 , . . . xpqk
)
, where xp1 , . . . , xpqk are the universally quantified
variables that precede Qk. More formally:
tk = fφk
(
xp1 , . . . xpqk
)
where {xp1 , . . . xpqk } = {m | 1 ≤ m < k ∧ Qm = ∀} and the sequence of subscripts
(pi)1≤i≤qk is strictly increasing. We then obtain
ψ˜ = ψ
[tk1 /xk1 ,··· ,tkm /xkm ]
where {xki | 1 ≤ i ≤ m} is the set of all existentially quantified variables of φ.
c. Removing all universal quantifiers from φ. The Skolem normal form of φ – denoted σφ
– becomes:
σφ = Qi1xi1 . . . Qitxit ψ˜
where the sequence of subscripts (xi)1≤i≤t runs through all universally quantified
variables of φ.
This way, any L-theory T is turned into its skolemized version: some L′-theory σT =
{σφ | φ ∈ T}.
2. One shows that the cardinality of the set of new function and constant symbols that have
been added to the language is either countable if the language is finite, and it is the same
as the one of the original language L if it is infinite. Therefore the extended language L′
has cardinality max{card (L) ,ℵ0}.
3. One takes any L-structureM of cardinality λ > κ such thatM |= T and construct some
L′-structureM′ by extendingM from L to L′. This is done by providing for every new
symbol fφk
(qk) an interpretation
fφk
(qk)M : |M|qk 7→ |M| such that it satisfies M′ |= σT .
With the classical approach, the description of the extensionM′ is usually messy, whereas
it simply does not exist with the game-theoretical approach.
2 A function symbol whose arity is zero is simply a constant symbol.
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4. One constructs some L′-structure N ′ of cardinality κ such that N ′ |= σT holds. So, one
selects some sub-domain of |M′| which is closed under all interpretations of functions
3 of L′. For this purpose, one starts with any subset N0 ⊆ |M′| of cardinality κ which
contains all interpretations of constant symbols from L′. We let Fk(L′) denote the set of
function symbols of L′ of arity k. By induction, one defines
Nn+1 = Nn ∪ {fM′(a1, . . . , ak) | k ∈ N, f ∈ Fk(L′), a1, . . . , ak ∈ Nn},
and one sets Nω =
⋃
n∈NNn. One observes that:
a. N0 ⊆ N1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Nω.
b. For all n ∈ N, card (Nn+1) = card (Nn) = κ, since the induction yields
κ ≤ card
(
Nn ∪ {fM′(a1, . . . , ak) | k ∈ N, f ∈ Fk(L′), a1, . . . , ak ∈ Nn}
)
≤ card (L′ ×N<ωn )
≤ card (κ× κ<ω)
≤ κ · κ
≤ κ
c. Hence card (Nω) = κ holds, since
κ ≤ card (Nω) ≤ card
(∏
n∈ω
Nn
)
≤ card (ℵ0 × κ) ≤ ℵ0 · κ ≤ κ.
d. Nω is closed under all interpretations of function symbols from L′. For if k ∈ N,
f ∈ Fk(L′), and a1, . . . , ak ∈ Nω, there would then exist some n ∈ N such that
a1, . . . , ak ∈ Nn, henceforth fM′(a1, . . . , ak) ∈ Nn+1 ⊆ Nω.
Therefore N ′ is defined by:
• |N ′| = Nω;
• for all constant symbols c, cN ′ = cM′ ;
• for all fonction symbols f of arity k, fN ′ = fM′ |Nωk ;
• for all relation symbols R of arity k, RN ′ = RM′ ∩ (Nω)k.
5. Finally, one shows that the model N defined as the restriction of N ′ to the language L
satisfies N |= T . This requires once again to review the construction ofM ′, by backward
this time: another wearisome moment for the students.
4 An alternative game-theoretical proof of LS↓
Compared to the previous proof, the game-theoretical proof that we advocate is simpler for it
only focuses on the original model and fixed winning strategies that witness that the theory
holds in this model. Indeed, this proof contains
no Skolem normal form
no extended language L′
no extensionM′ ofM
no restriction N of N ′
In this proof, we start with any model M such that both card (|M |) ≥ κ and M |= T hold.
We also assume that every formula φ ∈ T is in prenex normal form4.
3 Including the constants which are the ones of arity 0.
4 We suppose that T 6= ∅ holds; otherwise, the result is simply straightforward.
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1. For each φ ∈ T we pick any winning strategy σφ for the Verifier in Ev (M, φ). By looking
at the very rules of the game, every student realises immediately that for each existential
Qixi in φ, the given strategy secures one element from |M| that only depends on the
previous choices made by her opponent (Falsifier). Since φ is in prenex normal form,
these choices made by Falsifier correspond precisely to the universal quantifiers preceding
Qixi. For instance, if φ is of the form
∀x1∃x2∀x3∀x4∀x5ψ
then the choices that Verifier makes – following σφ – of an element a2 ∈ |M| for x2 and
an element a5 ∈ |M| for x5 depend respectively of the choices made by Falsifier of an
element a1 ∈ |M| for x1, and of elements a1 ∈ |M| for x1, a3 ∈ |M| for x3, a4 ∈ |M|
for x4. In other words, the winning strategy picks for xi an element that is function
of – meaning that it only depends on – the choices made for the universally quantified
variables that come before xi. Assuming there is k-many such universally quantified
variables, this induces a unique function fσφi : |M |k 7→ |M |. So we come up with a set
F =
{
f
σφ
i | φ ∈ T
} ∪ {fM | f ∈ L} of functions of different arities5 whose cardinality is
at most κ = max{card (L) ,ℵ0}.
2. We take any subset N0 ⊆ |M | of cardinality κ and proceed as in (4)(a-d) to obtain the
least (for inclusion) subset N ⊆ |M | of cardinality κ that satisfies both N0 ⊆ N and N
is closed under all functions in F .
3. We form N as the restriction of M from |M| to N , and show that N |= T in a
straightforward manner this time, since for every formula φ ∈ T the very same strategy6
σφ which is winning for the Verifier in Ev (M, φ) is also winning for the Verifier in
Ev (N , φ).
5 An even simpler proof of LS↓
This proof does not even require to go through the formulas of T to be in prenex normal
form.
1. for each φ ∈ T , pick any winning strategy σφ for the Verifier in Ev (M, φ) and for any
A ⊆ |M| consider all possible plays in Ev (M, φ) such that
a. Falsifier restricts his ∀-moves to choosing elements of A, and
b. Verifier applies her winning strategy σφ.
set (A)σφ as the subset of |M| formed of all the ∃-moves made by Verifier. Set also
(A)F =
{
fM(~a) | f ∈ L a function symbol with arity k,~a ∈ NVn k
}
,
2. inductively define N by:
a. NF0 ⊆ |M| any set s.t. card
(
NF0
)
= κ, {cM | c constant ∈ L} ⊆ NF0 ,
b. NFn+1 = NFn ∪
(
NFn
)F ∪ ⋃
φ∈T
(
NFn
)σφ , and N = ⋃
n∈N
NFn . Then,
card (N) = κ (N)σφ ⊆ N (N)F ⊆ N .
3. Form N as the restriction ofM to N , and easily verify that N |= T , since the very same
σφ is winning for Verifier in Ev (N , φ).
5 Functions of arity 0 being identified with elements of the domain |M |.
6 Strictly speaking this is the restriction of this strategy to N .
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6 Conclusion
We tried these proofs on our own students at EPFL. It turns out that they understand much
better the proof of LS↓ that we recommend than they buy the classic one. It also requires
much less time to teach, and above all we deeply believe that this proof highlights what is
essential in this result now devoid of all the technical details of the skolemization. On the
other hand, there is a price to pay in doing so: one has to present the semantics of first-order
logic through evaluation games. But here also we have noticed that the students learn more
easily this other part of the course. Another advantage of the game-theoretical approach
is also that it paves the way for the back-and-forth method [3] or the Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé
games [2] that are intensively used in model theory [5].
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